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Россия в международной цифровой налоговой реформе:  
общий или индивидуальный путь?











Аннотация. Целью данного исследования является разработка предложений 
по реформе российского законодательства в части налога на прибыль организаций 
в условиях становления цифровой экономики. Для этого в работе рассматриваются 
международные налоговые инициативы по адаптации налоговых систем к новым 
вызовам в совокупности с анализом текущего состояния российской налоговой 
системы в «цифровом» контексте. Установлено, что на сегодняшний день государства 
следуют политике внедрения односторонних мер в налоговое законодательство в связи 
с отсутствием глобального консенсуса относительно реализации скоординированной 
реформы. Следование такому сценарию приводит к росту правовой неопределенности 
для бизнеса и налоговых органов. Учитывая, что реформа корпоративного 
налогообложения в «цифровых» условиях имеет стратегическое значение для России, 
авторы предлагают рекомендации, направленные на совершенствование налогового 
законодательства, среди которых можно выделить совершенствование концепции 
резидентства юридических лиц, введение временного налога на оказание цифровых 
услуг, трансформацию механизма удержания налога у источника на исходящие роялти 
и уточнение налоговой классификации услуг, оказываемых в цифровой форме.
Ключевые слова: цифровизация, международное налогообложение, цифровая 
экономика, цифровой налог, налоговое резидентство, ОЭСР, Россия.
Научные специальности: 12.00.04 –  финансовое право; налоговое право; бюджетное 
право; 08.00.10 –  финансы, денежное обращение и кредит.
1. Introduction
International tax law is currently under-
going a process of significant reform at global 
tax governance level. This work is coordinat-
ed mostly by the Organisation of Economic 
Co- operation and Development (OECD) as 
part of its Base Erosion and Profits Shifting 
(BEPS) project. Under BEPS Project both 
OECD and non- OECD states are cooperating 
and harmonising their international tax poli-
cies to promote international economic coop-
eration and counter fiscal evasion. The aim of 
these reforms is to adapt the corporate income 
tax systems in individual states so that it can 
face modern challenges such as digitalisa-
tion and tackle harmful tax competition and 
offshore tax avoidance. These issues are in-
terrelated because digitalisation can ease tax 
competition and create new opportunities for 
tax evasion.
Russia is a large and growing market for 
foreign digitalised businesses, and its own 
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economy is currently going through a process 
of digitalisation. Therefore, tax law reform 
that seeks to adapt existing methodology for 
the new digital reality is on the agenda of Rus-
sian tax policymakers.1 Such putative reform 
requires international consistency and a solid 
rethinking of the existing rules at domestic 
level. The goal of reform should be to create 
a level playing field for foreign and domes-
tic digital businesses and ensure the neutral 
treatment of digital and non- digital business 
models while preventing opportunities for tax 
avoidance. In this research, we discuss sce-
narios and building blocks for international 
and domestic tax policy reform in Russian 
context.
The paper is structured as follows. Fol-
lowing this introduction, Section 2 provides a 
review of the theoretical and conceptual back-
ground of tax challenges relating to digitalisa-
tion based primarily on findings from OECD 
reports and theoretical literature. In Section 3, 
we formulate the key problem that we are trying 
to solve. In Section 4, we outline our research 
approach. In Section 5, we discuss internation-
al tax policy developments at a global level and 
unilateral measures taken by individual states. 
In Section 6, we formulate key tax challenges 
in Russia and discuss several barriers for po-
1 See, for example: Osnovnye napravlenija bjudzhetnoj, 
nalogovoj i tamozhenno- tarifnoj politiki na 2020 god i na 
planovyj period 2021 i 2022 godov [The main directions of 
budget, tax and customs and tariff policy for 2020 and for 
the planning period of 2021 and 2022] (2019). Available at: 
https://minfin.gov.ru/common/upload/library/2019/10/main/
ONBNiTTP_2020–2022.pdf
tential reform. Section 7 concludes and sum-
marises the key results.
2. Theoretical  
and conceptual framework
Widespread penetration of digital tech-
nologies into all areas of life has resulted in a 
hastening of the process of structural economic 
transformation. The use of digital technologies 
has led to a significant transformation of exist-
ing business models and to the appearance of 
new ones (OECD, 2018). It also contributes to 
the internationalisation of all aspects of busi-
ness (Devereux, 2017) explained by the rela-
tively low cost of entering foreign markets and 
the potential for quickly increasing the supply 
of successful digital products.
Considering that the existing system 
of international taxation was developed for 
traditional (non- digital) international busi-
nesses, it now requires some kind of ‘digital 
transformation’. In the opinion of experts at 
the OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy and Ad-
ministration, the following barriers for inter-
national tax rules require in- depth revision 
(see Table 1).
The global COVID-19 pandemic has 
shown that these challenges tend to expand. 
As tax revenues from traditional industries fall 
due to economic downturn, additional taxation 
of the digital sector can potentially compensate 
for this loss of fiscal revenue. However, consid-
ering current growth in the volume in world-
wide digital transactions, no country is yet able 
to tax efficiently the local share of income that 
Table 1. Challenges of digitalisation and the international tax system
№ Criteria Description of the challenge
1 Nexus Defining tax nexus with jurisdiction, considering the falling importance of foreign 
companies’ physical presence in order to do business in a source/market state.
2 Data Tax delineating, accounting and characterising the share of value creation, attributed 
to a data (provided both by individuals and businesses) and the processing of this data 
with digital technologies.
3 Characterisation Characterisation of payments made by new types of digitalised business for tax pur-
poses (e. g. in cloud computing businesses).
Source: Compiled by the authors based on OECD data (OECD, 2018)
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foreign digital businesses obtain from its mar-
ket. This problem can be solved either unilater-
ally or multilaterally.
3. Statement of the problem
All methodological problems concerning 
the current crisis of international tax rules are 
highly relevant to Russia for a variety of rea-
sons. First, there are currently no instruments 
in Russian tax law that result in the efficient 
taxation of local profits of foreign digitalised 
companies that have merely a virtual presence 
in Russia. Second, Russia is a large and grow-
ing market for foreign digitalised businesses, 
and therefore the profits of these in Russia are 
undertaxed. Third, Russia is home to two large 
digital platforms (Yandex and Mail.ru) and a 
net exporter of IT services; therefore, it has 
an interest in sustainable and long- term glob-
al digital tax reform. Fourth, Russia suffers 
from a problem of tax base erosion and profit 
shifting, and aggressive tax planning with the 
low- tax jurisdictions that can increase in the 
digital reality. Fifth, Russian tax law needs a 
systematic update to be in line with the de-
velopment of new digital businesses to make 
rules certain and clear in this area. Finally, 
Russia is a G20 economy and a participant in 
OECD’s BEPS project; therefore, it is an im-
portant player in the global tax governance 
arena.
All of these issues could potentially 
lead to a high level of uncertainty, losses of 
revenue, subsequent losses in the global tax 
competition game and distortion of the com-
petitive level playing field in the local mar-
ket in favour of foreign digitalised compa-
nies. The problem that the authors are trying 
to solve with this research is how to develop 
Russian tax law and policy approaches to 
properly address the tax challenges of dig-
italisation.
4. Methods
In this research we highlight and com-
pare the OECD’s tax policy view and individ-
ual countries’ experiences in implementing 
unilateral digital tax reforms. This analysis 
allows us to show an important tax policy 
context and formulate recommendations to 
further develop international tax rules in Rus-
sia’s domestic legislation and its approach to 
international tax treaty policy.
5. International tax policy discussion outline:  
A global consensus or the development  
of unilateral measures?
A multilateral solution requires a co- 
ordinated approach in reforming international 
tax rules. The OECD, as a key player in global 
tax governance, is currently developing such a 
consensual approach under the continuation of 
its BEPS project (OECD, 2015). Reports by the 
OECD related to digital business taxation show 
that developing, emerging and developed coun-
tries participating in the BEPS project agree on 
the importance of achieving a co- ordinated 
solution for the reform of the international tax 
system. However, they hold differing positions 
on areas under discussion such as the design, 
depth and scope of such reform (OECD, 2018). 
Besides working on a proposal for radical glob-
al tax reform (Pillar 1 Proposal), the OECD is 
also developing several technical documents 
whereby narrow aspects of international tax 
rules are discussed, including the characterisa-
tion of digital transactions and concept of cor-
porate tax residence.
One such example is the characterisation 
of digital payments as royalties or business 
income in the Commentaries to OECD Mod-
el Tax Convention (2017). The key idea de-
veloped in this document is the use of the de 
minimis principle as a borderline criterion. The 
essence of this principle is the analysis of the 
economic and legal substance of transactions 
to make conclusions about the volume of copy-
right for the transfer of digital products to the 
customer. If such volume of copyright exceeds 
the de minimis threshold, a transaction could be 
classified as the provision of rights for the use 
of intellectual property, and therefore income 
could be classified as royalties. Otherwise, ac-
cording to paragraph 2 of the Commentary, in-
come should be classified as business income 
(OECD, 2017, p. 275).
Another example is the concept of corpo-
rate residence in digitalised economic reality. 
Although the OECD has discussed this concept 
for a long period of time, the solution it found 
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can be considered problematic. The OECD 
notes that situations of double tax residence of 
corporate entities are exceedingly rare in prac-
tice and therefore could be resolved by mutu-
al agreement procedure and consultation be-
tween the competent authorities of both states 
(OECD, 2021). We suggest that, considering 
the growth of digitalised businesses and the 
use of digital technologies, such a position is 
not sustainable in the long term. Increasingly, 
international digital businesses are managed in 
practice by executive teams who communicate 
across digital networks and reside in different 
states, putting pressure on the concept of cor-
porate residence (Lucas- Mas, 2021). This can 
be especially hard if the executives are digi-
tal nomads without vital interests in any state 
(Kostic, 2019).
So, considering the de facto inability of the 
OECD as a global tax coordination body until 
recently to reform urgently and consistently 
the international tax system due to an endless 
list of practical, technical and methodological 
issues, we can observe a global tendency to-
wards unilateral measures. Examples of such 
measures are listed in Table 2.
Unilateral tax reform measures are attrac-
tive, especially for large developing and emerg-
ing economies with a high number of users of 
digital products. Such reform is politically ac-
ceptable, as a tax on foreigners and can gener-
ate revenues for funding government projects. 
Nevertheless, the introduction of such unilater-
al measures can contradict the basic principles 
of existing international tax rules and there-
fore create economic barriers and distortions, 
including double or even multiple taxation of 
same economic profits across several jurisdic-
tions (European Parliament, 2019). The wide-
spread adoption of unilateral measures can 
potentially lead to international disputes and 
disagreements if treaty partners have an op-
posing economic interest. One recent example 
was a warning by the United States embassy in 
Prague of potential economic sanctions if the 
Czech Republic planned to introduce a unilat-
eral digital services tax at a rate of 7 % (U.S.­
warns, 2020).
Unilateral reforms can potentially lead to 
legal uncertainty for foreign companies and 
complexities with the administration of new 
taxes. This can also be the case when such 
taxes impose a wider scope of taxation at the 
source state than existing tax treaties. Israel 
declared its intention to introduce unilateral-
ly a digital services tax in the middle of 2019 
Table 2. Unilateral measures aimed at taxation of digital business profits.
Measure Countries
Reforming the permanent establishment (PE) concept. Israel, Indonesia, India, 
Slovakia, Saudi Arabia
Taxing digital payments by withholding at source and (or) extending the definition 
of royalties to include digital payments.
Malaysia, Vietnam
Introduction of digital services tax (DST) or equalisation levies. By their design, 
such taxes usually have low rates (1.5–5 %). Tax base is determined as the gross 
amount of revenues obtained by foreign digitalised companies from local sources 
(B2B or B2C).
Austria, France, Hunga-
ry, Italy, India, Turkey, 
United Kingdom
Introduction of specific tax regimes to tax the diverted profits of the largest MNEs 
(including digitalised businesses). In fact, this is a special anti- avoidance rule devel-
oped into a separate tax regime to apply in parallel with existing international tax 
treaties and not to be bound by the limitations of the existing tax treaties.
United Kingdom
Reforming the concept of corporate tax residence (definition of the place of ‘effec-
tive management’). Most states do not set detailed algorithms for the application of 
corporate tax residence criteria for digitalised businesses. Therefore, in practice, a 
variety of criteria can be relevant, which would lead to legal uncertainty.
India, South Africa, Chi-
na
Source: Compiled by the authors
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because the virtual permanent establishment 
(PE, significant economic presence) concept 
introduced beforehand was de facto ineffective 
(Fuchs, Israel seeks, 2019). Application of the 
PE definition as extended to cover digital reali-
ty and virtual presence leads to treaty override 
and is therefore problematic (Fuchs, Analysts 
Evaluate, 2019). A similar situation happened 
in Slovakia. New legislative norms introduced 
there resulted in virtual PE for digital plat-
forms. This situation resulted in the initiation 
of mutual agreement procedures by some of 
Slovakia’s tax treaty partners that aimed to re-
solve their dispute about the treaty’s interpreta-
tion (Stojaspal, 2018).
Considering the context described above, 
experts suggest that a multilateral solution is 
likely to be the only possible way forward (Si-
montacchi, 2020). The OECD has been work-
ing on such a multilateral solution, which by 
the end of 2020 contained blueprints with two 
pillars for reform. Pillar 1 included new rules 
on digital nexus and profit allocation for the 
largest MNEs that would lead to taxation of 
the residual profits of such companies based on 
their digital presence (on the level of sales of 
users in the market states) (OECD, Tax Chal-
lenges… Report on Pillar One, 2020). Pillar 2 is 
based on the idea of setting a global minimum 
corporate income tax rate for the undertaxed 
profits of the largest MNEs in order to set the 
limits of international tax competition and stop 
the remaining tax avoidance practices (base 
erosion and profit shifting issues) (OECD, Tax 
Challenges…Report on Pillar Two, 2020). Both 
ideas require an unprecedented level of tax co-
operation among the players on the internation-
al tax stage, including policymakers, govern-
ments, tax administrations and MNEs.
Preliminary assessments by the OECD 
show that the enactment of both pillars of re-
form could result in tax revenue growth of 
USD100 billion globally (Martin, 2020). This 
estimation is in fact a lower threshold of the 
interval, indicating a potentially global loss of 
tax revenues due to the issues of base erosion 
and profit shifting and aggressive tax planning 
(USD100–240 billion).2
2 See, for example, OECD. (2020). International collabora-
tion to end tax avoidance. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/
We suggest that the proposed reform 
could only partly contribute to achieving its 
goals, based on two arguments. First, each ju-
risdiction could still set its own tax rate and 
tax base, which would leave some room for 
new tax planning strategies and tax competi-
tion practices. Second, Pillars 1 and 2 require 
not only principles but also administrative 
mechanisms. Such mechanisms have been 
proposed by the OECD (OECD, Tax Chal-
lenges…Report on Pillar One, 2020); howev-
er, they are all built on the idea of early dis-
pute prevention and resolution by a panel of 
tax administrations that is in fact another face 
of the binding arbitration mechanism. Binding 
arbitration can be against the domestic policy 
rules of many developing and emerging coun-
tries for reasons of political economy because 
of their contradicting economic interests with 
developed countries.
6. Discussion of the Russian perspective  
on international tax challenges  
in a digitalised economy:  
Challenges and proposals for moving forward
As the analysis above shows, both multi-
lateral and unilateral solutions have their pros 
and cons. Russia must closely monitor these 
developments if it is to figure out its own strat-
egy for adapting its tax system to global chal-
lenges. Some considerations that are important 
for a discussion of reforms to deal with the 
challenges of corporate taxation in a digital-
ised world are described below. These policy 
considerations have been developed from an 
initial draft report published by the authors of 
this article in Russian as a chapter of a book 
published by the Gaidar Institute of Economic 
Policy in 2021 (Rossiskaya ekonomika, 2021). 
The report was revised, extended and updated 
by the authors in consideration of recent chang-
es in tax policy.
We do not limit the scope of our proposals 
to the problem of choosing between Pillar 1 and 
any of the unilateral solutions, but we discuss 
the potential reforms in the broader context of 
tax law, including corporate residence criteria, 
tax characterisation of supplies in digital form 
tax/beps/ (accessed 5 June 2020).
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and taxation of royalties at the source state. 
The proposals are not intended to cover all the 
issues in relation to addressing the digital tax 
agenda, but rather to express some ideas that 
the authors consider important for current tax 
policy discussion in Russia.
6.1 First challenge:  
Taxing foreign businesses  
with a virtual presence in Russia
Current rules based on physical presence 
for tax nexus at source cannot effectively lead 
to taxation of the profits of foreign companies 
that were obtained from a digital presence in 
the market jurisdiction, and therefore they must 
be updated to reflect the economic interests of 
Russia as a large and growing market for digi-
tal businesses.
As of June 2021, there are no instruments 
in Russian tax law to tax the local profits of 
foreign digital companies with merely a virtual 
presence in Russia. This would lead to losses 
of revenue and a distortion of the competitive 
level playing field in the local market in favour 
of foreign digitalised companies.
In Table 3, the authors present their esti-
mations of potential tax revenues as a result 
of multilateral (Pillar 1) and unilateral (digital 
services tax, DST) paths of digital tax reform 
in Russia. This is based on the delineation of 
the share of the Russian users of foreign digital 
companies’ websites based on the geographical 
distribution of internet traffic (using data from 
the SimilarWeb portal3 as of April 2020). The 
steps and results of this analytical approach are 
presented below.
The authors’ estimation shows that DST 
reform could generate RUB37.8 billion of 
additional revenues (based on 2019 financial 
data), which is about 4 times higher than Pil-
lar 1 reform results. Tax revenues from Pillar 
1 could be even lower, considering that Rus-
sia has its own digital platforms (Mail.ru and 
Yandex) that have a significant virtual pres-
ence in the markets of former Soviet Union 
states. Their income from this foreign virtu-
al presence can be attributed to these foreign 
states and therefore credited in Russia under 
Pillar 1 rules.
3 https://www.similarweb.com/
Even considering these estimations, we 
cannot suggest that DST is a preferable option 
because it could lead to problems for inter-
national economic cooperation in the digital 
economy between Russia and developed states 
(US and other OECD member states). Consid-
ering that Russia is a net exporter of IT ser-
vices, such co- operation and access to foreign 
markets is important for its companies. What is 
more, digitalised Russian companies working 
in foreign markets would be likely to pay more 
tax in high- tax jurisdictions, and their over-
all tax burden would be likely to increase due 
to unilateral digital tax measures introduced 
abroad.
DST may also be more fiscally efficient 
than Pillar 1 because it has a much simpler 
design and therefore requires fewer costs for 
administration and compliance. Russian tax 
administration is now reasonably developed 
and digitally savvy, and it could potentially 
administer DST.4 Recent experience of the in-
troduction of VAT on B2C digital services in 
2016 showed that foreign digital companies 
have been complying with Russian rules and 
remitting their VAT to Russian budgets. Pil-
lar 1 methodology is still only at the develop-
mental stage. It contains a number of highly 
complex technical issues that could potentially 
lead to disputes among states. The mechanism 
of early prevention and subsequent resolution 
of such disputes discussed in the 2020 Pillar 1 
OECD Blueprint (OECD, Tax challenges…Re-
port on Pillar One, 2020) requires the de facto 
transfer of part of sovereign tax administration 
capacity to multilateral level. Russia has little 
experience in participating in mutual agree-
ment procedures and did not accept a ‘man-
datory binding arbitration’ mechanism5 when 
4 In particular, speaking at the session of the Forum on Tax 
Administration held in Chile in 2019, its head, Hans Christian 
Holte, pointed to the leadership of the Russian Federal Tax 
Service in shaping the experience of digitalisation of the tax 
sphere in the world. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3930370
5 According to an FAQ on the OECD’s multilateral instru-
ment, the ‘mandatory binding arbitration is a mechanism 
which, in defined circumstances, obliges the parties to the 
treaty to submit unresolved issues in a MAP case to an in-
dependent and impartial decision- maker–an arbitration pan-
el.’ The decision reached by the arbitration panel is binding 
on the parties to the treaty and thus resolves the issues that 
can otherwise prevent agreement in deadlocked MAP cases. 
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it joined the OECD’s multilateral instrument 
(MLI) (OECD, 2019). As explained by a Minis-
try of Finance official during a recent academ-
ic conference, Russia cannot accept sharing its 
tax sovereignty with foreign states for reasons 
broader than tax policy (including international 
politics).6
Considering the arguments discussed 
above, the following policy recommendations 
could be made to address the challenges men-
tioned at the beginning of this section. We 
suggest that Russia could introduce DST as an 
interim measure and subsequently cancel it if 
multilateral consensus regarding taxation of 
the digitalised economy were to be reached at 
OECD and BEPS project level.
The following notes explain our position 
in this regard:
1) Administrative simplicity and fiscal ef-
ficiency arguments outweigh the fairness and 
international consistency considerations in the 
See: https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/MLI-frequently- asked- 
questions.pdf. Part VI of the MLI discloses the principles of 
the mandatory binding arbitration mechanism. https://www.
oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral- convention- to- implement- 
tax- treaty- related- measures- to- prevent- BEPS.pdf
6 From the speech of Ekaterina Vinogradova, Head of the 
International Tax Relations Division of the Tax Policy Depart-
ment of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, at 
the Eurasian Tax Week (Financial University under the Gov-
ernment of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 23 March 2021). 
https://eurasiantaxweek.ru/ru/business- program/
current tax policy context. In other words, ex-
tending taxation rights would be a more prag-
matic and achievable goal for Russian policy-
makers than the aim of consistently updating 
global rules.
2) From an economic perspective, DST fits 
well with Russia’s role as an important market 
for foreign digitalised businesses, considering 
its large and increasingly digitally savvy pop-
ulation.
3) DST can compensate the a loss of bud-
get revenues under the 2020 ‘IT-manoeuvre’ 
tax reform that offered large tax reductions for 
Russian IT companies (i. e. reduction of social 
contribution rate from 14 % to 7.6 %, reduc-
tion of corporate income tax rate from 20 % to 
3 % and exemption from VAT only for Russian 
software7).
4) A number of foreign developing and 
developed countries have already introduced 
such unilateral measures, and it seems un-
likely that these measures would reverse the 
expansion of global digitalised MNEs (espe-
cially during the COVID-19 pandemic, with 
7 Notably, according to representatives of the US Trade Rep-
resentative Office (USTR), the implementation of such a tax 
scenario leads to a distortion of the conditions of international 
competition. In this regard, USTR plans to assess how the im-
plemented measures affect US exports, up to and including an 
appeal to the WTO, if they discriminate against US services 
exports. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2020/
Russia2020WTOReport.pdf
Table 3. Comparative analysis of revenues from joining Pillar 1 and the in-
troduction of a digital services tax (DST) in Russia
№ Pillar 1 OECD DST at 5 % rate
1 Delineation of digital global companies based on their revenues (>EUR750 billion) and functions. Re-
sults show that key digital players on the Russian market include Google, Alibaba and Booking.com.
2 Delineation of traffic to global websites from Russia and its share of overall traffic.
3 We assume the same level of profitability = 20 % 
and the same level of distribution of profits to mar-
ket jurisdictions (Amount A) = 40 % for calculat-
ing the Russia- sourced income.
We multiply overall revenues on the share of Rus-
sian traffic to calculate the Russia- sourced DST tax 
base.
41 Computation of result using CIT rate of 20 %. Computation of result using DST rate of 5 %.
+RUB10 billion (equivalent to ~USD153.8 million). +RUB37.8 billion (equivalent to ~USD581.5 mil-
lion).
Source: Compiled by the authors
1 The weighted average dollar exchange rate for IFRS purposes from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 
2019 of 65 rubles was used. https://www.audit- it.ru/currency/sr_vz.php
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such companies receiving fantastic profits). 
Therefore, Russia would be part of a global 
tax policy trend in this regard, considering the 
post- COVID-19 economic context and goals 
of fiscal consolidation and taxing residual 
windfall profits of digitalised businesses (UN, 
Tax challenges, 2017).
A separate discussion is likely to be need-
ed to decide if such a tactical policy recom-
mendation is valid in the context of the prog-
ress of multilateral tax cooperation, which has 
intensified during 2021 under the leadership 
of US Minister of Finance Janet Yellen.8 How-
ever, this global tax governance initiative is 
fundamentally not a total game- changer and 
still requires a great deal of technical work 
and policy discussion for it to be implement-
ed. Therefore, uncertainty remains towards 
achieving a global solution, and key argu-
ments in favour of potential Russian unilat-
eralism in its digital tax reform path, as dis-
cussed above, are still valid.
6.2 Second challenge:  
Tax residence concept in digital reality
Tax residence criteria for companies 
do not fit with the realities of the digitalised 
economy. Incorporation criteria are formal 
(thus, they could be avoided or manipulated), 
while the criteria for effective place of man-
agement are uncertain and could potentially 
lead to base erosion and profit shifting issues. 
This is because such locations could be moved 
to low- tax jurisdictions as the use of digital 
technologies for communication and remote 
management increasingly becomes standard 
practice.
As of June 2021, Article 247.2 of the Tax 
Code of the Russian Federation sets out two 
broad corporate residence criteria. First, Rus-
sian companies (companies legally registered 
in Russia) are Russian tax residents. Second, 
foreign companies and structures could be 
Russian tax residents if they are managed in 
Russia. At least one of the following conditions 
8 See, for example: Wilkie, C. (2021, 1 July). 130 na-
tions­agree­ to­ support­US­proposal­ for­ global­minimum­ tax­
on corporations. CNBC. Available at: https://www.cnbc.
com/2021/07/01/nations- agree- to- support- us- proposal- for- 
global- minimum- tax- on- corporations.html (accessed 21 July 
2021).
must be fulfilled to trigger the second of these 
criteria:
• The company’s management is per-
formed by an executive body located in Russia 
on a regular basis.
• The company’s management is per-
formed by key executives for the most part in 
Russia.
Neither the tax code nor letters issued by 
Ministry of Finance directly address the ques-
tion of what constitutes ‘regular’ management 
in a foreign company. The concept of manag-
ing ‘for the most part’ by key executives is also 
unclear (Volosov, 2019). That is why it is im-
portant to assess the volume and quality of the 
management function performed in Russia to 
answer the question of whether a foreign com-
pany is a Russian tax resident. Such an uncer-
tain approach does not fit with socioeconomic 
realities of the digitalised future and is also not 
in line with Russia’s interests in the context of 
developing its international tax policy.
Notwithstanding the efforts of Russian tax 
policymakers to de- offshorise the economy, the 
number of foreign companies and legal struc-
tures holding Russian assets is still consider-
able (Volosov, 2019). What is more, in 2018, 
Russia introduced a tax law with two new spe-
cial administrative regions (SARs) in Vladivo-
stok and Kaliningrad with preferential holding 
tax regimes for redomiciled foreign holding 
companies. However, the number of companies 
using these tax exemptions is still modest.9
At the same time, using foreign companies 
incorporated in Cyprus or other jurisdictions 
with preferential tax regimes for digital proj-
ects is a popular practice for Russian business 
in the IT and digital sector (Milogolov, 2020). 
Such companies can be regarded as CFC and, 
as such, their profits would be subject to tax 
in Russia at the amount attributed to the con-
trolling person (Russian tax resident). Howev-
er, a number of exemptions under Russian CFC 
rules can lead to a scenario whereby profits 
of foreign companies remain undertaxed in 
9 With reference to an interview with Deputy Minister of 
Economic Development Ilya Torosov, we can conclude that, as 
of October 2020, 36 companies were residents of SARs. In our 
opinion, however, we can expect an increase in this number 
due to the revision of double tax treaties. https://www.interfax.
ru/interview/734972
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Russia. Exemptions apply to companies that 
receive less than 80 % of their profits from 
active business and to purely holding and sub- 
holding companies (Article 25.13–1 of the Tax 
Code of the Russian Federation). In the case 
of digital businesses, if corporate entities that 
collect payments for digital services or provide 
IP rights for software are located in foreign 
low- tax countries, profits could be attributed to 
such foreign entities and the Russian tax base 
would be eroded.
Therefore, we suggest amending the cor-
porate tax residence criteria in Russia with the 
aim of ensuring its taxation rights as a state of 
residence in the context of virtual businesses. 
We propose two ideas for such a reform. First, 
assessment of the economic functions per-
formed by a company in each state, and analy-
sis of key executives’ place of permanent resi-
dence (or place of vital interests), would serve 
as useful extensions to the existing criteria for 
corporate residence under Russian domestic 
law. South Africa’s experience could be useful 
in this regard (SARS, 2012). Second, formali-
sation of corporate tax residence criteria could 
also ensure tax certainty. Analysis of the geo-
graphical distribution of a company’s assets 
and employees could serve as valuable evi-
dence to support the conclusion of its economic 
nexus with Russia as its state of residence.
This would also be important for applying 
tax treaties in the case of conflict over double 
tax residence. It would be likely that such con-
flict could be resolved under a mutual agree-
ment procedure between respective competent 
authorities. The design of this dispute resolu-
tion mechanism for Russian tax treaties and 
domestic legislation was recently updated af-
ter Russia joined the MLI (OECD, Multilateral 
Convention, 2020).
6.3 Third challenge:  
Tax characterisation of digital supplies
There is uncertainty over the tax character-
isation of supplies in digital form under double 
tax treaties and domestic tax legislation. This 
uncertainty creates risks both for the taxpay-
er and in tax administration, in that taxpayers 
would not be certain of their future tax liabili-
ties, and therefore anticipated after- tax income, 
while there is also the risk of underpayment 
and tax avoidance for tax administrators.
Analysis Russia’s tax law has led us to 
observe a high level of uncertainty in the clas-
sification of income received by foreign com-
panies from the provision of digital supplies 
under licence agreements. Different character-
isations lead to varying levels of taxation for 
such income due to differing rules covering 
the taxation of royalties and business income 
in domestic law and tax treaties. The level of 
taxation can be either more or less favourable, 
which depends on a number of factors and cir-
cumstances in each case.
Licence agreements limit the use of in-
tellectual property by the licensee. Any such 
transaction can contain the transition of part of 
full copyright, other author’s rights, know- how 
or secret formula. Therefore, complex analysis 
is needed to determine the category of income 
received under a license agreement. The Min-
istry of Finance has clarified10 that it follows 
the de minimis approach recommended by the 
OECD (OECD, 2017). The qualitative charac-
teristic of transferred rights is a key criterion 
for determining if such supply can be classified 
either as a royalty or business income.
In the case of mixed contracts (for provi-
sion of goods/services and some IP rights), it 
is unclear if the taxpayer should determine the 
main goal of such transactions or delineate each 
type of supply separately. The Commentaries 
on the OECD Model Tax Convention (2017) 
(OECD, 2017) recommend the latter approach. 
There is no explicit guidance or court practice 
dealing with this issue in Russia.
Considering the importance of creating 
neutral, stable and definitive rules for digital 
and non- digital sectors of the economy, we 
suggest that addressing the technical issues of 
digitalisation should be a key focus for Russian 
tax policymakers. As indictors outlining Rus-
sia’s approach to these issues, we suggest us-
ing the de minimis principle as a key criterion 
for differentiation between royalties and busi-
10 See, for example: Letter of the Ministry of Finance No. 
03–08–05/19799. (2021, 19 March). Available at: http://tax-
pravo.ru/zakonodatelstvo/statya-443394-pismo_minfina_ros-
sii_ot_19032021_g__03_08_05_19799 (accessed 21 July 
2021).
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ness income that is already used in the Com-
mentary to the OECD Model Tax Convention 
(2017) (OECD, 2017) and also the tax legisla-
tion of foreign states such as Singapore (IRAS, 
2013). We do not support the recent initiative 
of the UN Committee of Experts in Tax Issues 
to extend the definition of royalties so that it 
includes any kind of payment for the use of 
software (UN, 2020). This is because such an 
approach would be likely to devalue different 
approaches to the taxation of income of a busi-
ness or capital nature, and thus the economic 
principles of international taxation.
What is more, the first part of the Russian 
tax code, which contains key definitions, re-
quires an update. For example, the definition of 
services in Article 38 (5) is outdated and does 
not fit with the definition of e- services for VAT 
purposes in Article 174.2 (See Table 4).
While Article 38 (5) of the tax code sets 
‘consumption in the process of creation’ as 
the key criterion for services, Article 174.2 is 
broader and sets its key criteria as ‘automatism’ 
and ‘the use of information technology and the 
internet’. For example, transferring industrial 
data for improving the process of manufac-
turing goods or for a 3D printing business can 
fall under the definition of e- services in Article 
174.2 but outside the definition of Article 38. 
This creates uncertainty in tax outcomes and 
the application of place of supply rules for ser-
vices in an international context.
The inconsistencies between the develop-
ment of different sets of rules in Russian tax 
legislation in the context of digitalisation is an 
important issue not only for VAT but also CIT 
and other taxes. A common approach is need-
ed for this to be updated; otherwise, constant 
conflicts would be likely between rules applied 
for the purpose of defining tax liabilities under 
different taxes (e. g. VAT and CIT) and under 
domestic rules or rules governed by interna-
tional tax treaties.
6.4 Fourth challenge:  
Taxation of royalties at source
The existing mechanism for the taxation 
of royalties by withholding at source on a 
gross basis is not economically well founded. 
Taxation of gross income can result in over-
taxation for the foreign licensor because it 
does not account for costs related to the de-
velopment of intellectual property (IP). This 
problem is relevant for the digital agenda be-
cause R&D function of IP is significant for 
digital businesses.
Under domestic tax legislation (Article 
309 of the tax code), royalties paid to non- 
residents (without permanent establishment) in 
Russia are taxed at a rate of 20 % on a gross 
basis. Such a cost can be deducted from the tax 
base of the royalty payer at the level of a Rus-
sian company exploiting this IP.
The mechanism of taxing royalties on a 
gross basis is not commensurate with the costs 
related to the development, enhancement, main-
tenance, protection and exploitation (DEMPE) 
of the IP. Neither does it correctly account for 
R&D costs incurred by the creator of the IP. 
This problem could in theory be resolved ei-
ther by exempting royalties from taxation at 
source or by taxing them on a net basis. Full 
exemption of royalties at source creates the risk 
of base erosion and profit shifting, especially 
in the context of Russia’s emerging economy, 
as explained in the paragraph below. Taxation 
Table 4. The difference in definitions of ‘services’ in the Tax Code of the Russian Federation
General definition of services  
for tax purposes (Article 38 (5) of the tax code).
Specific definition for international VAT  
purposes of services provided  
in electronic form (Article 174.2 of the tax code).
‘Services’ for the purpose of taxation are defined as 
activities resulting in intangible character that are con-
sumed and supplied in the process of their creation.
For the purposes of this chapter, the supply of services 
in electronic form is defined as the supply of services 
through information- telecommunication network ‘In-
ternet’ automatically and with the use of information 
technology.
Source: Compiled by the authors
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of royalties on a net basis is a methodologically 
and administratively complex idea and is also 
discussed below.
Our analysis of data at a macro level 
(performed at 2018) showed that there is a 
bias in the geographical structure of juris-
dictions that receive royalties from Russia 
in favour of so- called ‘transit jurisdictions’. 
These jurisdictions can be defined as coun-
tries with an abnormally high level of royal-
ties received in relation to R&D spending in 
their economies and also an abnormally high 
level of FDIs in relation to the size of their 
GDP. Tax treaties between Russia and these 
jurisdictions usually contain a zero rate for 
outbound royalties at the source state (Ire-
land, Switzerland, Cyprus, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg) (Berberov, Milogolov, 
2018). Therefore we can suggest that com-
panies and SPEs incorporated in such ju-
risdictions are artificially included in MNE 
corporate structures for tax planning purpos-
es, while most of the substantive functions 
relating to intangible assets (triggering the 
payment of royalties) are in fact located in 
other jurisdictions. That is why exempting 
royalties at the source state creates the fiscal 
risk of base erosion and profit shifting.
In the context of discussing the taxation of 
royalties on a net basis, the following options to 
account the costs incurred by the licensor are 
potentially available (Trepelkov, 2015):
− Unfinal withholding tax, whereby the 
foreign licensor can deduct all or only specially 
mentioned types of costs against income re-
ceived.
− Application of withholding tax at low-
er rates, which results in taxation of the antici-
pated (deemed) net financial result of the licen-
sor.
− Taxing only part of the gross amount 
of royalties paid.
Our suggestions for reforming the mecha-
nism of withholding the taxation of royalties in 
Russia include several ideas:
1) Lowering the domestic withholding 
tax rate for outbound royalties (currently set at 
20 %) to 10 %.
2) Renegotiating a higher withholding tax 
rate for royalties in Russian bilateral tax trea-
ties (especially in treaties with ‘transit jurisdic-
tions’ mentioned above).
3) Allowing the credit of part of foreign 
companies’ expenses related to the creation 
and development (including R&D) of the ob-
ject triggering royalty payments equal to the 
amount of costs incurred on the territory of 
Russia, or if such R&D was outsourced, to 
Russian contractors (subcontractors).
Such an approach is based on the follow-
ing policy considerations. First, it protects 
against aggressive tax planning in the form of 
misclassification of other types of income into 
royalties (UN, Protecting the Tax Base, 2017). 
Second, it is in line with the policies of most 
emerging countries, where outbound royalties 
are usually taxed at non- zero rate at source 
(Deloitte, 2021), and it protects against tax 
avoidance in the form of structuring IPs into 
low- tax hub jurisdictions (UN, United Nations 
Model, 2017). Finally, crediting expenses in-
curred in Russia can serve as a tax incentive for 
foreign companies to locate their R&D facili-
ties on Russian soil and thus develop Russia’s 
potential in R&D.
7. Conclusion / summary of key results
Today we are seeing a revolution in corpo-
rate tax reform at an international level.11 This 
reform is based on arguments following on from 
a discussion of the impact of digitalisation on 
the global economy, business practices, society 
and international corporate tax law. One of key 
aspects of this discussion is how the taxation 
rights of states will be spread in the new reality 
among emerging and developed states and also 
between countries where digitalised businesses 
are based and countries where such businesses 
earn their revenues. Co- ordination of tax policy 
is crucial for levelling the playing field for inter-
national digitalised businesses and ensuring that 
the tax base is not eroded at global or national 
level. Some countries have been taking unilat-
eral measures to ensure their tax sovereignty in 
the new digital economic reality, marking their 
11 See: G20. (2021, 9–10 July). Communique of the Third 
G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meet-
ing. 3rd Finance Ministers and Central Bank Meeting. Avail-
able at: https://www.g20.org/wp- content/uploads/2021/07/
Communique- Third- G20-FMCBG-meeting-9–10-July-2021.
pdf (Accessed 21 July 2021).
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Table 5. The digital economy and proposals for reforms in Russia
Challenge Solution
Absence of taxation of business profits of foreign com-
panies or those without a physical presence in Russia.
DST as an interim measure and subsequently joining 
the OECD’s Pillar 1 proposal.
Corporate tax residence criteria can be manipulated in 
a digital business reality.
New formalised mechanical criteria for corporate resi-
dence based on geographical distribution of assets and 
key executive staff. This can show an economic nexus 
with Russia.
Uncertainty in tax characterisation of supplies in digi-
tal form under domestic tax rules and double tax trea-
ties.
Profound re- writing of tax definitions to fit with the 
new digital reality in first (general) and second (spe-
cific) parts of the tax code. Harmonisation of charac-
terisation rules, definitions and criteria for VAT, CIT 
and tax treaties.
Withholding tax on royalties creates the risk of base 
erosion and profit shifting in the case of licensors re-
siding in treaty ‘transit’ jurisdictions and excessive 
taxation in the case of licensors residing in non- treaty 
countries and ‘non- transit’ treaty jurisdictions.
Applying same withholding tax rates for royalties paid 
from Russia to licensors located in treaty and non- 
treaty states (after renegotiating tax treaties with tran-
sit jurisdictions). Crediting R&D expenses incurred on 
Russian territory against the royalty revenues taxed at 
source.
Source: compiled by the authors
‘virtual borders’ and ‘virtual territories’ under 
their tax jurisdictions. This tax policy agenda is 
relevant for Russia, considering its role as key 
market for digitalised businesses. Therefore, the 
authors’ recommendations that are summarised 
in Table 5 are relevant for a tax policy discussion 
of further adaptation of Russian tax rules for a 
digitalised reality.
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